

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (CLOSED)

04FEB13

ASSAULT (II)

CONTROL: 01FEB13-MEDJ-0008-7GNA/C

I/CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI CITY, DJIBOUTI/AGGRAVATED ASSAULT INVOLVING
FOREIGN NATIONAL CONTRACTORS

COMMAND/DOD INTEREST/00000

MADE AT/MEDJ/DJIBOUTI - NCISRU (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT

EXHIBIT(S)

- (1) IA: Results of Attempt to Interview (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
- (2) IA: Results of Interview of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
- (3) IA: Results of Gendarmerie Meeting
- (4) Copy of Debarment Letter (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. This specific phase investigation was initiated on 01Feb13 following notification from Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ) Base Police of an alleged assault involving two foreign national contract employees aboard CLDJ. NCIS involvement was limited to assisting in determining the status of the victim and the transfer of the suspect to Djiboutian authorities for arrest and prosecution. Both suspect and victim are civilian contractors employed by Pacific Architects & Engineers (PA&E), the primary maintenance and facilities contractor aboard CLDJ. Inquiries determined the suspect, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) a Djiboutian national, assaulted his supervisor (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) a Filipino national, with a crowbar after (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was told he was being terminated. After the assault, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was taken to the CLDJ Emergency Medical Facility (EMF), and then transported to a local hospital where he was treated for several fractured ribs and punctured lung. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was apprehended by CLDJ Base Security while attempting to leave base and was taken to the NCIS office where he was briefly interviewed and admitted to assaulting (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). He was then turned over to the Djibouti Gendarmerie and placed under arrest for local prosecution. The crowbar used in the assault was recovered by PA&E Security and was provided to the Gendarmerie. Following the incident CLDJ issued a debarment letter which NCIS delivered to the Gendarmerie prison for issuance to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). This specific phase investigation was used to document limited assistance provided to CLDJ and the Djibouti Gendarmerie. No further assistance is anticipated and this investigation is closed.

NARRATIVE

1. This specific phase investigation pertains to suspected violation of aggravated assault, which will be prosecuted under Djiboutian law.
2. 01Feb13 Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ) Base Police reported an alleged assault had just occurred involving two foreign national PA&E contract employees aboard CLDJ. Initial reporting from Base police was the suspect

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CONTROL: 01FEB13-MEDJ-0008-7GNA/C

04FEB13

allegedly struck the victim several times with a crowbar and efforts were underway to locate and apprehend him, while the victim had been transported to the CLDJ Emergency Medical Facility (EMF) for treatment.

3. On 01Feb13, attempts to interview the assault victim, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Filipino national, at the CLDJ EMF were unproductive as the attending physician, LCDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN, advised (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was not able to speak to NCIS. Following his initial treatment at CLDJ EMF, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was transported to a local Djiboutian hospital. Exhibit (1) pertains.

4. On 01Feb13, CLDJ Base Police apprehended the suspect, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Djiboutian National, as he was attempting to exit CLDJ through the Scorpion Gate. Base Police transported (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) to the NCIS office where he was fully identified and briefly interviewed during which he admitted to striking (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) in the back with a crowbar two to three times. Exhibit (2) pertains.

5. On 01Feb13, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was turned over to the Gendarmerie in Djibouti City where he was placed under arrest and charged with the assault of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). In addition, the crowbar used in the assault, recovered by Mr. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) PA&E Security Supervisor, was also provided to the Gendarmerie for evidentiary purposes. Exhibit (3) pertains.

6. On 02Feb13, LT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN, Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), CLDJ, requested assistance in providing (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) with a debarment letter prohibiting his return to CLDJ. NCIS provided the original copy of the letter to the Gendarmerie who advised they would provide the letter to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). A copy of the letter is Exhibit (4).

7. On 07Feb13, contact with the PA&E liaison office aboard CLDJ determined they would coordinate all future assistance and medical care for (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) as well as his appearance in future court proceedings.

8. The Gendarmerie advised they do not anticipate any further NCIS assistance in the prosecution of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). This specific phase investigation is closed.

PARTICIPANTS

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT, NCISRU Djibouti

ACTION

023B: ONLY report.

DISTRIBUTION

NCISHQ:0023

ACTION:023B

INFO :MEDJ/MEFO

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PAGE 2 LAST (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) LNN

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (INFO)

01MAY13

SPECIAL INQUIRY (II)

CONTROL: 01MAY13-MEDJ-0047-7XCR

I/2/138TH FIELD ARTILLERY REGIMENT, CAMP LEMONNIER,
DJIBOUTI/UNIDENTIFIED GUNSHOTS ORIGINATING FROM THE WEST SIDE OF THE
FLIGHT LINE ON CAMP LEMONNIER

COMMAND/CAMP LEMONNIER/3379A

MADE AT/MEDJ/DJIBOUTI - NCISRU

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT

NARRATIVE

1. On 01MAY13, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) was notified by the Command Operations Center (COC) on Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ), that force protection personnel from 2/138 Field Artillery Regiment (FAR), United States Army National Guard Kentucky (USANGKY) heard multiple gunshots originate from the west side of the flight line near Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti at 0545. The CLDJ flight line is located along the south side of Ambouli International Airport, Djibouti. Perimeter security of the airport is provided by forces from the Djibouti Air Force while the 2/138 FAR is responsible for security of the CLDJ portion of the flight line.

2. On 01MAY13, Reporting Agent (RA) made contact with SSG (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USANGKY for clarifying details. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reported that he took over as Sergeant of the Guard for the flight line shortly after the gunshots were heard at 0545. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reported that he approached the Djiboutian Air Force Security post on the west side of the flight line in order to inquire about the gunshots. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he spoke with a Djiboutian dressed in the Djiboutian Air Force Battle Dress Uniform (BDU), who was manning their typical security post. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) did not have further identifying information about the Djiboutian. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that the Djiboutian spoke some English. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reported that he asked the Djiboutian about the gunshots and the Djiboutian told (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) he was the one who shot the rounds in the air. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reported that the Djiboutian said that he fired the rounds while excited.

3. On 01MAY13, RA and linguist (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), made contact with LT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Djiboutian Air Force. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is in charge of the Djiboutian Air Force Security Forces at the flight line. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he investigated the gunshots. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that his Djiboutian Air Force Security Force admitted to firing the rounds. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) further stated that the rounds were fired into the air as the individual attempted to load what he believed was an empty magazine. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) ruled the discharge as accidental.

4. This report is for information purposes to alert effected Commands of the nature of the gunshots, and to alert Commands that the Djiboutian Air Force conducted an internal inquiry.

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CONTROL:01MAY13-MEDJ-0047-7XCR

01MAY13

NCISHQ:023B

INFO :MEFO/002A/Command (Attn: CAPT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C))

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (CLOSED ONLY)

03AUG13

MISSING PERSON (II)

CONTROL: 02AUG13-MEDJ-0088-7MNA/C

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

SUPP: DOD CONTRACTOR WITH LOCKHEED MARTIN

COMMAND/DOD INTEREST/00000

MADE AT/MEDJ/DJIBOUTI - NCISRU (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT

EXHIBIT(S)

- (1) IA: Results of contact with Camp Lemonnier Security
- (2) IA: Results of contact with the Djiboutian National Police
- (3) IA: Results of Interview with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CIV
- (4) IA: Results of Interview with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

NARRATIVE

1. This reactive investigation was initiated subsequent to the report of a missing person under unusual or suspicious circumstances. No criminal statutes currently apply.

2. On 31Jul13, at approximately 2000 hrs, NCISRA Djibouti (MEDJ) personnel were notified by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CIV, Site Manager, Lockheed Martin, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ), that one of his employees was missing. Specifically, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reported (b)(6), (b)(7)(C), CIV, had not shown up for work at his designated time. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was supposed to report to a designated bus spot at 1230 hrs for transportation to his work at an off site location. For background, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is a Department of Defense (DoD) civilian contractor with Lockheed Martin and currently maintains a SECRET clearance; however, according to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) has no access to SIPRNET. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was described as a "wrench turning guy/mechanic." (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) has completed three months of a four month deployment and has resided in a Containerized Living Unit (CLU) on camp during his time at CLDJ.

3. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised he and his coworkers searched the entire camp and could not locate (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). Additionally, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) checked with the Quarterdeck, which had no record of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) signing out for any type of liberty. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated one of his contractors believed (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) may have a girlfriend in town and believed (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) may have left camp to go visit the girlfriend. The aforementioned girlfriend supposedly worked and or lived at a bar/hotel in the Menelik square/downtown Djibouti area (NFI).

4. Upon notification, MEDJ personnel checked with the Base Access Control Office (BACO) and Camp Operations Center (COC) to inquire on (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) possible departure/arrival at the camp's front gate. According to Army personnel located at the front gate, someone possibly fitting (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) description was observed leaving camp around 1600 hrs. Additionally, Army

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CONTROL: 02AUG13 -MEDJ-0088-7MNA/C

03AUG13

personnel at the front gate believed (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) may be the same civilian who leaves the camp frequently at night. The BACO and COC were given NCIS contact information and instructed to notify NCIS if (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) returned to camp. Additionally, MEDJ personnel verified with the Quarterdeck on CLDJ that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had not signed in/out per liberty policy, Exhibit (1) pertains. Subsequent to all camp checks, NCIS made contact with the local Djiboutian National Police (DNP) stations to determine if there were any reports of an American who had been arrested, involved in an accident, or transported to a hospital in town. Additionally, contact was made with the local hotels and hospitals in the area. All attempts to locate (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) were negative, Exhibit (2) pertains.

5. On 01Aug13, around 0600 hrs, MEDJ personnel were notified by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had been located in his CLU. At the request of NCIS, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) came to the MEDJ office on 01Aug13 at 1100 hrs to further discuss the aforementioned report, Exhibit (3) pertains. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) initially reported he was sick and was on base all day; however, after further questioning, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) admitted to leaving the base in a taxi. Additionally, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated he returned to base between 0200-0300 hrs that morning. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) could not provide the name of the bar he went to, but admitted to meeting an Ethiopian female named (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated he has met (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) approximately five (5) times in the past for "companionship". (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reported (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) has never asked him about his job, security clearance, or camp access, Exhibit (4) pertains.

6. On 01Aug13, command members from CLDJ and Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) were briefed on the status of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). Additionally, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Regional Security Officer (RSO), US Embassy, Djibouti, and (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Regional Security Manager, Lockheed Martin, were briefed on this investigation.

7. Records checks of the DoD Employee Interactive Data System (DEIDS) and the Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) confirmed (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is a DoD contractor with Lockheed Martin and maintains a SECRET clearance. Additionally, DEIDS reported (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is an E4/Senior Airman in the US Air Force Reserves, 555 Red Horse Squadron, Nellis Air Force Base, NV. Records checks of the Consolidated Law Enforcement Operations Center (CLEOC) database resulted in no derogatory information being discovered. Records checks in additional law enforcement databases reflected (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had two previous misdemeanor charges for Domestic Violence. Both of the aforementioned charges, were reported by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department with the dates of arrest being 30Nov06 and 05Feb11, respectively.

8. On 03Aug13, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reported (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was being removed from the contract at CLDJ and would return to the US on 04Aug13. This investigation is closed.

PARTICIPANTS

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

SPECIAL AGENT, DJIBOUTI - NCISRU
SPECIAL AGENT, DJIBOUTI - NCISRU
SUPERVISORY SPECIAL AGENT, DJIBOUTI - NCISRU
LINGUIST, DJIBOUTI - NCISRU

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

CONTROL:02AUG13-MEDJ-0088-7MNA/C

03AUG13

ACTION

023B: Only Report

DISTRIBUTION

NCISHQ:023B

ACTION:023B

INFO :USAF 99th Security Forces Squadron, Nellis AFB (Attn:
Inv (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)) (E)/COMMAND SJA, CJTF-HOA (Attn: CAPT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (H)/COMMAND SJA, CLDJ (Attn: LT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (H) /
014C/002A/MEFO/COMMAND CO, 449th Air Expeditionary Group
(Attn: Col (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (H)

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PAGE 3 LAST (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) LNN

WARNING

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (INFO)

03DEC14

SEXUAL ASSAULT - ADULT (II)

CONTROL: 02DEC14-EUSA-0491-8SCR

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

COMMAND/NAVY OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL/MARINE FORCES RESERVE, NEW ORLEANS /

MADE AT/EUSA/FORCE PROTECTION DETACHMENT SOUTH AFRICA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT

EXHIBIT(S)

- (1) IA: RESULTS OF EFFORTS TO VERIFY THE IDENTITY OF
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 02DEC14... (Copy All)

NARRATIVE

1. On 25NOV14, Reporting Agent (RA) received notification from Participating Agent (PA) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Regional Security Officer, Johannesburg, that during the conduct of an interview pertinent to a Department of State background investigation of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) revealed she was raped by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) brother-in-law, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) in 2008 in Paris, France.

2. During the interview, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) were staying with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) in Paris, France while (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was deployed to Iraq. After the three of them were out drinking alcohol most of the day, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) forced her to take Ambien sleep medication. When (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) who also took Ambien, was sleeping (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reported (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) pulled (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) out of the bathroom and raped her.

3. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated she did not report the incident to the French police or the US Embassy in Paris, France, as she was afraid of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) who she knew to be a military judge with the US Navy. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) added she returned home to South Africa the following morning so she did not have time for further action. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that, after the incident, she took an abortion-inducing pill and was tested for HIV. During the interview, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also stated (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) thought the incident was consensual and cited it as additional grounds for (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

4. On 25NOV14, RA conducted open source Internet checks to specifically identify (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Initial checks identified a (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) as Deputy Counsel at Navy Office of General Counsel/Marine Forces Reserve, New Orleans and that he was Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, Eighth Coast Guard District, from JUL06 to DEC09 and that he was a US Coast Guard (USCG) Officer, which would include the time of the reported incident. On 28NOV14, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) verified that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Exhibit (1) pertains.

5. On 28NOV14, RA called (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) related she wanted to press

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CONTROL:02DEC14-EUSA-0491-8SCR

03DEC14

charges against (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and was willing to provide a formal statement regarding the incident.

6. On 03DEC14, National Crime Information Center (NCIC), Defense Law Enforcement Data Exchange (DDEX), and Consolidated Law Enforcement Operations Center (CLEOC) checks of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) met with negative results. Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) checks revealed (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) has a current, SECRET clearance.

PARTICIPANTS

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE, , Regional Security Officer, Johannesburg, South Africa

ACTION

R.0023: Due to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) being an Officer in the USCG during the time of the alleged rape, please coordinate with US Coast Guard Investigative Service (CGIS). Please contact RA prior to CGIS notification to coordinate efforts on this possible, future investigation. RA can be contacted at (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) state.gov.

DISTRIBUTION

NCISHQ:023B

ACTION:0023 (E)

INFO :EUFO/CNNR/002A

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PAGE 2 LAST (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) LNN

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (INFO)

09JUL14

SPECIAL INQUIRY (II)

CONTROL: 02JUL14-MEDJ-0069-7XCR

I/THREAT TO CAMP LEMONNIER VIA FACEBOOK POST

COMMAND/CAMP LEMONNIER, DJIBOUTI/N3379

MADE AT/MEDJ/DJIBOUTI - NCISRU (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT

EXHIBIT(S)

- (1) IA: NAVSUP LOSS PREVENTION CASE REPORT/02JUL14
- (2) IA: RECEIPT OF EMAILS/09JUL14

NARRATIVE

1. Case initiated based on information received from LT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN, concerning a 23JUN14 posting on the Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ) Facebook page stating the following : "How you doing combined joint task force, am writing you about a high criminal nickname Big Musa who works at NEX Warehouse, he wants to steal some weapons and terrorized the Camp, a case his already served in prison of Djibouti. I love Americans but cowards like this should be stopped at the bagging area before he reach and do his dirty crimes inside the base. And one other thing how comes no one from the base don't check employees criminals record???" MJR (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, Director Public Affairs, Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa, provided information that the message was posted by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

2. On 28JUN14, Reporting Agent (RA) and Participating Agent (PA) (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) interviewed (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) regarding a CLDJ Facebook page posting made by former NEX employee (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) alluding to violent intentions by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) against Americans. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he had been in trouble with Djiboutian authorities three to four years ago for fighting and that the minor issue was resolved without any prison time as alleged in (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Facebook post. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) also disavowed any intentions to hurt Americans on or off base. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that his NEX job provides the sole support for his immediate and extended family. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated that he had been attacked by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) at work on two occasions about three months ago. Per (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was mentally unstable and would often say random, antagonizing things to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) while they were working at the NEX. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) continued that on one occasion, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) attempted unsuccessfully to attack him with a box cutter in the warehouse area of the NEX over a minor dispute pertaining to work. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) indicated that shortly after, in front of the bathrooms next to the basketball area aboard CLDJ, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) encountered (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) walking toward him and again (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) tried to slash him with the box cutter. Per (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) he received minor cuts from this altercation. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) said that a manager witnessed the altercation and broke up the fight. It is (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) understanding that (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was fired the following day. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was not certain about exact dates. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) believes that this is most likely the reason (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) made the derogatory post on Facebook. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) asserted that he has not had any contact with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) since the incident on base and that

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

CONTROL: 02JUL14-MEDJ-0069-7XCR

09JUL14

they had no prior history before working together aboard CLDJ.

3. RA obtained the internal investigative report from (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Loss Prevention employee at the NEX. The report supports statements made by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) during the interview and provide amplifying details regarding dates and times of the assaults as well as witnesses to the events. Exhibit (1) pertains.

4. RA coordinated with CLDJ Force Protection on 02JUL14 in order to initiate a BOLO and base debarment for (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). In addition, RA requested that local Djiboutian authorities question (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) about his derogatory Facebook posts.

5. Additionally, on 09Jul14, PA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) received a series of emails from CMSgt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Senior Enlisted Leader, CJTF-HOA PAO, regarding emails received in the PAO Organization box on 20Jun14; however, the emails were not read until 09Jul14. The emails were sent from (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) reporting there were criminals in the camp and there was a tunnel in which terrorist could use to get inside the camp. The contact number listed matches the cell phone number of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). Exhibit (2) pertains.

6. Criminal history queries were conducted on both (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). The checks revealed (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was detained as a youth but not arrested as he and other children of Djiboutian National Police (DNP) officers snuck into a DNP armory. No one was arrested as a result of the incident. The checks revealed (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) had been previously arrested for writing one bad check. No further information was provided.

PARTICIPANTS

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C)

PERVISORY SPECIAL AGENT, DJIBOUTI - NCISRU
SPECIAL AGENT, RESIDENT AGENCY NORFOLK

DISTRIBUTION

NCISHQ:023B

INFO :CDR (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (SJA CLDJ) (H)/MEFO/MEDJ

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (CLOSED ONLY)

06APR14

SPECIAL INQUIRY (II)

CONTROL: 04APR14-MEKE-0004-8XMA/C

I/MISCONDUCT AT THE CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSION, NAIROBI, KENYA

COMMAND/COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE - HORN OF AFRICA/65047

MADE AT/MEKE/FORCE PROTECTION DETACHMENT KENYA/ (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT

EXHIBIT(S)

- (1) Statement of COL (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USA/04Apr14...(Orig CMD; copy all others)
- (2) Statement of CAPT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN/08Apr14...(Orig. CMD; copy all others)
- (3) IA: RESULTS OF INTERVIEW FOR (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) 04Apr14...(Copy all)
- (4) Military Suspect's Acknowledgement and Cleansing Waiver of Right for MSgt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC/04Apr14...(Orig. CMD; copy all others)
- (5) Statement of SGT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USA/04Apr14...(Orig. CMD; copy all others)
- (6) Military Suspect's Acknowledgement and Cleansing Waiver of Rights/04Apr14...(Orig. CMD; copy all others)
- (7) IA: RESULTS OF INTERVIEW FOR (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CIV/08Apr14...(Copy all)
- (8) IA: RESULTS OF INTERVIEW FOR (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) CIV/08Apr14...(Copy all)

NARRATIVE

1. On 04Apr14, COL (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USA, Senior Defense Official/Defense Attache, US Embassy Nairobi notified Reporting Agent that MSgt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USMC, Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), US Embassy Nairobi and SGT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USA, Military Information Support Team, US Embassy Nairobi were seen engaged in inappropriate behavior while attending a diplomatic liaison event at the Canadian High Commission (CHC), Nairobi, Kenya on 03Apr14.

2. On 04Apr14, COL (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) received notification from (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Regional Security Officer, US Embassy Nairobi who was advised by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) of the CHC, that two US Embassy military members, MSgt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) were discovered having sex in the women's restroom at the CHC on 03Apr14. Exhibit (1) pertains.

3. On 07Apr14, CAPT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USN, Liaison Officer in Charge, CJTF-HOA, US Embassy Nairobi stated he attended the same event with MSgt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and others, but did not observe him in a drunken state or overly friendly with SGT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). According to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) he was initially notified of the incident by COL (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) on 04Apr14 and they jointly discussed the issue with MSgt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). MSgt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was not afforded his Article

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

CONTROL: 04APR14 -MEKE-0004-8XMA/C

06APR14

31B rights; however, he did admit to sexual contact with SGT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) at the CHC on 03Apr14. Exhibit (2) pertains.

4. On 04Apr14, MSgt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was interviewed and elected not to provide a written statement. MSgt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) advised all interactions between him and SGT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was consensual. MSgt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated, to the best of his knowledge he consumed five (5) beers and one (1) mixed drink during his time at the liaison event. Exhibits (3) and (4) pertain.

5. On 04Apr14, SGT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was interviewed and stated she and MSgt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) engaged in consensual sexual intercourse on 03Apr14 in the CHC woman's locker room during the diplomatic liaison event. SGT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated she consumed one (1) beer prior to engaging in sexual intercourse with MSgt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) and one (1) beer after the incident. Exhibits (5) and (6) pertain.

6. On 08Apr14, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Security Program Manager, Canadian High Commission (CHC), Nairobi, Kenya related she was advised on 04Apr14 that MSgt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was seen engaging in sexual intercourse during the CHC liaison event on 03Apr14. She notified (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Regional Security Officer, US Embassy Nairobi via email on 04Apr14. Exhibit (7) pertains.

7. On 08Apr14, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) of a CHC member, Nairobi, Kenya advised she heard sounds from a female that she believed to be sexual in nature emanating from the women's changing room at the CHC on 03Apr14 during a liaison event. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) stated she later observed MSgt (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) departing the area followed by a woman with (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) hair later identified as SGT (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). She notified (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) of her observations. Exhibit (8) pertains.

PARTICIPANTS

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT, Diplomatic Security Service, US Embassy Nairobi
(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT, Diplomatic Security Service, US Embassy Nairobi

ACTION

MEDJ: Provide a complete copy of this investigation to the Commanding Officer, CTJF-HOA and Commanding Officer, SOCFWD, Camp Lemioner, Djibouti. Upon receipt of original documents provide to SJA, CJTF-HOA.

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: MEDJ (E)

INFO : 002A (E) / MEBJ (E) / MEDJ (E)

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PAGE 2 LAST (b)(6), (b)(7)(2) LNN

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (CLOSED ONLY)

07JAN13

BOMB AND ARSON (II)

CONTROL: 04JAN13-MEDJ-0001-6ANA/C

I (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) ASTER SGT USAFR

COMMAND/DOD INTEREST/00000

MADE AT/MEDJ/DJIBOUTI - NCISRU (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT

EXHIBIT(S)

- (1) IA: SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE...(Orig SCPD/Copy 0023)
- (2) Fingerpring Cards...(SCPD Only)

NARRATIVE

1. This specific phase investigation was conducted under suspected violations of New York Penal Code, Burglary 2nd NYS PL, section 140.25.2, C Feloney and Arson 3rd NYS PL, Section 150.10 C Felony.

2. On 04Jan13, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) Detective, Arson Section, Suffolk County, (NY), Police Department (SCPD) requested limited NCIS investigative assistance concerning a SCPD arson investigation. According to (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) on 27Dec12, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) residence was burglarized, set ablaze and his personally owned vehicle (POV) was stolen and later recovered. At the time of the incident, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was deployed to Camp Lemmonier, Djibouti City, Djibouti. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) a member in the USAF reserves is employed full time as a State Trooper with the State of New York. In addition to the arson and vehicle theft, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) law enforcement credentials and off duty weapon were also stolen. Detective (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) requested assistance in obtaining (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) DNA for elimination purposes only. SCPD case numbers 12-789657 and 12-789375 germane.

3. On 05Jan13, Reporting Agent (RA) contacted (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) at the NCISRA Djibouti, Building 103, Camp Lemmonier, Djibouti City, Djibouti. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was apprised of the need to obtain a sample of his DNA and his fingerprints for elimination purposes.

4. At approximately 1403 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) voluntarily provided a sample of his DNA utilizing buccal swabs, in addition to his fingerprints. The aforementioned buccal swabs were entered into the NCISRA Djibouti evidence custody system under log number 001-13. Exhibit (1) and (2) pertain.

5. On 07Jan13, the fingerprints and evidence were registered mailed to Detective (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) under registered mail number RE 216 275 343 US. This NCIS investigation is closed.

6. A copy of this report is being provided to Detective (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SCPD, Arson Section, 30 Yaphank Ave, Yaphank, NY 11980 during the month of January 2013, for routine Law Enforcement purposes.

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U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
CONTROL:04JAN13-MEDJ-0001-6ANA/C

07JAN13

ACTION

0023: ONLY REPORT

DISTRIBUTION

NCISHQ:0023 (M)

ACTION:0023 (E)

INFO :MEFO (E)

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PAGE 2 LAST (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) LNN

Pages 16 through 21 redacted for the following reasons:

-----Page (16)-(17): Case Control Number: 04JUN13-MEDJ-0060-8SNA/C - Referred to the Air Force Office of Special Investigations for review/return
Page (18) - (19): Case Control Number: 04OCT15-MEDJ-0249-8SNA/C - Referred to the Air Force Office of Special Investigations for review/return
Page (20) - (21): Case Control Number: 05FEB14-MEDJ-0010-8SNA/C - Referred to the Air Force Office of Special Investigations for review/return

U.S. NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (CLOSED)

05MAR13

SEXUAL ASSAULT - ADULT (II)

CONTROL: 05MAR13-MEDJ-0025-8SNA/C

I/U.S. AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS/REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE
TO INTERVIEW WITNESS IN SUSPECTED SEXUAL ASSAULT

COMMAND/DOD INTEREST/00000

MADE AT/MEDJ/DJIBOUTI - NCISRU (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT

EXHIBIT(S)

(1) Sworn Statement of A1C (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF/05Mar13

NARRATIVE

1. This specific phase investigation was initiated in reference to suspected violation of Uniform Code of Military Justice Article 120 (Rape and Sexual Assault).
2. On 04Mar13, NCISRA Djibouti, received a written request from the U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), Peterson Air Force Base (AFB), CO, to conduct a witness interview of A1C (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, regarding her knowledge of A1C (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, reportedly sexually assaulting A1C (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) USAF, in the summer of 2011. (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) is assigned to 303 Expeditionary Rescue Squadron (ERQS), Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti.
3. On 05Mar13, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) was interviewed at NCISRA Djibouti and provided a sworn statement denying any knowledge of (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) being sexually assaulted by (b)(6), (b)(7)(C). Exhibit (1) pertains. Per AFOSI, no further assistance is required. This investigation is closed.

PARTICIPANTS

(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) SPECIAL AGENT, NCISRA Djibouti

ACTION

0023: ONLY Report

DISTRIBUTION

NCISHQ:0023

ACTION:0023

INFO :AFOSI Peterson AFB (Attn: SA (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (M) /MEFO

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PAGE 1 LAST (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) LNN

Page 23 redacted for the following reason:

Page (23): Case Control Number: 06AUG14-MEDJ-0082-8SNA/C - Referred to the Air Force Office of Special Investigations for review/return